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A Place at the Table: Nepal and the 
Social and Political Impacts of 
Digital Inequality
By Elizabeth Saldaña
On November 19, 2012, a young woman arrived in the Tribhuvan 
International Airport in Kathmandu, Nepal. Sita Rai (a pseudonym) 
was returning from working as a domestic in Saudi Arabia. Upon 
arrival at the airport, immigration officials noticed that she was 
traveling on a fake passport and detained her along with fifteen 
other women. After a few hours in detention, an immigration officer, 
Somnath Khanal, demanded a bribe of Rs (Nepalese Rupees) 218,000—
around $2500 USD—to ensure that she would not be prosecuted for 
traveling without documentation. Sita paid the bribe and lost most of 
the money she had earned while working abroad. Khanal let Sita go 
on November 21, 2012, and a police officer, Parsuram Basnet, offered 
to escort Sita to a bus park to return home. He took her to a lodge near 
the bus park and repeatedly raped her. He threatened her and told 
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her to tell no one about the robbery or the rape. A few weeks later, 
however, she broke down and told her sister and brother about the 
robbery. Sita’s family enlisted the help of the women’s organizations 
and the media to bring charges against Khanal and Basnet. [1]
By December 12, human rights advocates and women’s organizations 
in Kathmandu were already staging sit-ins and demonstrating for 
justice for Sita. [2] Sita’s brother filed a complaint with the Ministry 
of Home Affairs on December 16, 2012, [3] and the Kathmandu Post 
began to report on the incident the following day. [4] Two weeks later, 
on December 28, approximately forty activists showed up outside 
Baluwatar, the residence of then-Prime Minister, Baburam Bhattarai. 
Activists initially began to organize on Twitter, and presented PM 
Bhattarai with a petition that had been circulated through email and 
Twitter. As they gathered, the Nepal Police told them the area was 
restricted, and forcibly removed them from the premises. [5] After 
the incident with the police, activists met to discuss their next steps. 
Someone in the group mentioned an American social movement, 
Occupy Wall Street, to which another activist joked, ”Hey we’re 
Occupy Baluwatar”. Another activist, Arpan Shrestha, tweeted, “The 
#OccupyBaluwatar sit-in protest will carry on today. Concludes at six 
with a candle vigil Please drop in for a few minutes. Please support.” 
With that tweet, Occupy Baluwatar was born. [6]
Occupy Baluwatar was not the first instance of political mobilization 
in Nepal that incorporated social media into its strategy, nor will it be 
the last. [7] People all over the world are increasingly incorporating 
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social media into their lives and politics. Despite its comparatively 
low Internet penetration, Nepal is no exception to this rule. [8] 
However, there are concrete limitations to the efficacy of social 
media use for political mobilization. In this essay, I examine Occupy 
Baluwatar as a case study in the difficulties of using social media as 
an organizational tool, and the impact of global digital inequality on 
smaller localized political mobilization. 
In looking at Occupy Baluwatar, I argue that digital inequality is 
the result of not only digital and infrastructural processes, but also 
acculturation and choice in information consumption. Jurgenson’s 
articulation of an “augmented reality” suggests that separating 
online-offline analysis is less useful than understanding how these 
two social worlds interact and overlap with each other. [9] From 
Jurgenson’s analysis, it follows that offline information gaps and 
differences in geopolitical power are reified and re-entrenched 
online. If Nepali political movements like Occupy Baluwatar have 
little influence on the political situation in geopolitically “powerful” 
countries like the United States, their online mobilization similarly 
reaches few in the United States and the West due to both structural 
and social processes. [10] In contrast, American political movements 
and decisions have important reverberations in Nepal, as I will show 
in the case of Occupy Baluwatar. I explore some of the implications of 
these one-way information flows in the conclusion of this essay.
Interface / Volume 1 / Issue 1 / Theorizing the Web 20144 /
After the initial protests and sit-ins, Occupy Baluwatar protestors 
continued to mobilize from late December 2012 to early April 2013. 
They relied on a variety of grassroots and online mobilization 
strategies to garner support from both Nepalis and international 
actors. 
Occupy Baluwatar activists used social media, particularly Twitter, in 
three primary ways: to amplify and spread information; to support 
and bond with each other; and to directly confront people in positions 
of power, including Baburam Bhattarai. They tweeted about police 
presence during and after the protests and about the arrests of 
activists like Ishan Adhikari and others. [11] They similarly posted 
news articles about Occupy Baluwatar, articles that came from Nepali 
and English-language daily newspapers in Kathmandu, and once or 
twice from international news sources. 
Activists also tweeted jokes and words of encouragement to each other 
during the movement. A small group of approximately twenty-six 
unique users produced the majority of the tweets since the movement 
began. Many of these users retweeted one another’s reports and 
commentary from the protests. These tweets exemplified the personal 
connections between activists and their investment in the movement; 
these connections helped keep Sita’s story and the protests alive from 
December 2012 until the movement’s end in April 2013. [12]
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Additionally, activists tweeted scathing remarks to Prime Minister 
Bhattarai. In an editorial in the Kathmandu Post, one activist 
and journalist, Bidushi Dhungel, criticized the government’s 
unwillingness to meet with activists and the difficulty of confronting 
Bhattarai directly. [13] Occupy Baluwatar activists circumvented these 
restrictions by tweeting at Bhattarai. They asked him to launch an 
investigation and berated his slow responses. Bhattarai occasionally 
responded to complaints and tweets, enabling activists to have a two-
way conversation with him, mediated through Twitter. 
Journalists and non-participants alike recognized the ways that 
social media helped to keep Occupy Baluwatar alive. [14] As I waded 
through the Twitter archive after the movement ended, I believed 
that these activists were the primary organizers of the movement. 
However, when I went to Nepal to speak with Occupy Baluwatar 
activists in person, I saw a different picture emerge than the one I 
saw online. As one activist and social media expert told me with a 
knowing smile, “The people online were not always the ones running 
the show.” 
The group of highly active Occupy Baluwatar Twitter users made 
passing remarks about others who spent less time on Twitter and more 
time focusing on grassroots organization. One of these grassroots 
activists, Bidushi, described this group’s strategies and goals for 
Occupy Baluwatar:
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…after that first day, some of us said, okay, how do we 
make this inclusive?…You know, so that it would include 
non-upper-middle-class English-speaking elite Nepalis? We 
wanted to include everyone…We tried to use very grassroots 
styles of organizing. We made posters in Nepali, and they 
were black and white, and we did them on cheap paper – we 
didn’t have a lot of money, so that was easier to do, and I 
mean, our posters looked awesome –…I remember one time 
we took like three hundred flyers and four motorcycles and 
just went and hung them in the middle of the night… [15]
These activists tried to speak to Nepalis in their mother tongue. They 
relied on phone trees, word of mouth, cheaply produced posters made 
from homemade materials, or public performances like arrests, street 
theater, and graffiti to reach Nepalis in offline social and political 
settings, using symbols and language that were organic to Nepal. 
These activists saw “ordinary Nepalis” from all walks of life as the 
source of political power within Kathmandu and tried to tap into 
these populations to garner support for the movement. [16] According 
to one activist, Ishan, Nepal needed “people to be active…to step into 
leadership positions to deal with problems.” [17] For these activists, 
it was important to galvanize the support and political strength of a 
multi-class, multi-caste, and multilingual group of Nepalis living in 
Kathmandu. 
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As the movement progressed, the Occupy Baluwatar organizers 
dispersed into two general groups with different ideas about the 
most effective ways to put pressure on Bhattarai and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to achieve justice for Sita. One group used social media 
to relay information to each other and outside actors and subvert 
the physical boundaries to governance that existed offline. The other 
group focused on addressing Nepalis in the streets of Kathmandu and 
getting them engaged in Sita’s struggle for justice. These divisions 
over strategies echoed broader class and infrastructural divisions 
among Nepalis in Kathmandu and made it difficult for movement 
organizers to agree on appropriate mobilization strategies. 
The difficulty of social media as an organizing tool stems from 
disparities in Internet infrastructure in Nepal. According to the 
United Nations, Nepal is classified as a “least developed country.” 
[18] According to the 2011 Nepali census, around 3.33% of Nepal 
has Internet access. [19] According to Ujjwal Acharya, a social media 
expert based in Kathmandu, if one includes access to cybercafés and 
mobile phones, Internet penetration is likely closer to around 12-15%. 
[20] Because of the high cost of personal computers, mobile phone 
maintenance, and Internet access in a city with rolling blackouts, 
the Internet is very much accessible only to the elites of Kathmandu. 
Bidushi commented that, “less than 1% of people in Kathmandu 
are on Twitter.” [21] Although low hourly rates for cybercafés are 
comparatively cheaper than the high, up-front cost of a computer 
or a mobile phone, access remains prohibitively expensive for many 
Nepalis. 
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For these reasons, the highly active Twitter activists seem to be 
targeting a very different group of Nepalis than were Bidushi, 
Ishan, and other primarily grassroots organizers. Although Twitter 
activists interacted with each other locally, they were interacting 
in a digital space that was not accessible to all Nepalis. Regardless 
of intent to include low-income, low-caste, or non-digitally linked 
groups, Twitter activists seemed to be focusing their activism on 
elites in Kathmandu, or towards Nepali expatriates abroad. [22] 
These differences in strategies and targets became a significant point 
of contention for these two factions of organizers within Occupy 
Baluwatar. These conversations among organizers were essentially 
debates about elitism and class given that certain groups were left 
out of political discussions because of their inability to meaningfully 
access the Internet. 
Meanwhile, as Nepali activists continued to pressure the Nepali 
government to bring charges against the perpetrators, Indian 
activists across the border similarly took to the streets to protest a 
similar incident in India in which six men brutally gang-raped a 
young medical student living in New Delhi. When she died from 
her injuries in mid-December 2012, protests broke out all over India. 
Protestors demanded justice for the young woman and structural 
and legal changes to more harshly punish rapists. The protests in 
India coincided with the timeline of events and protests in Nepal 
surrounding Occupy Baluwatar; two countries in South Asia were 
ignited at the same time, with a shared interest in ending violence 
against women. 
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In response to the Delhi rape protests, the Internet and news media 
outlets exploded in outrage. American commentators knowingly 
cited India’s “patriarchal values” and hostility to women as the cause 
of the rape, and they were not alone. [23] Indian news media and 
women’s advocacy groups criticized widespread sexist behaviors 
and practices in India as the underlying cause of this act of violence. 
In news comment sections online, many Nepalis weighed in on the 
problem of “North Indian patriarchal values” that influenced Nepal 
and its response to women’s rights and public safety. [24] The problem 
of rape in Nepal bore important commonalities with rape in India.
Because of the increased reporting on violence against women in 
India, Sita’s case and Occupy Baluwatar could theoretically have 
given Nepali advocates and activists a foothold in an international 
discussion about violence against women in South Asia.  However, 
while the Delhi incident received substantial coverage from traditional 
news media, social media users, and activists, Occupy Baluwatar 
saw far less coverage from Western media outlets, despite Nepal’s 
and India’s shared border, histories, and mobilizations against rape. 
Although activists in both Nepal and India were dealing with similar 
questions of rape and women’s public safety, far fewer people saw the 
conversation about Nepal’s Occupy Baluwatar movement. Within the 
regional public space of South Asia, Nepalis may have been drowned 
out by the conversations happening all around them. 
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What accounts for the discrepancies in media coverage and social 
media commentary between the Nepali movement and the Indian 
movement? One possible explanation is the differences in Internet 
infrastructure between India and Nepal. In regards to the Delhi rape 
incident, Twitter became a source of information and commentary 
from both Indian and non-Indian Twitter users. However, as discussed 
above, Twitter remains a largely untapped source of information and 
engagement within Nepal. Even if everyone currently on Twitter 
in Nepal tweeted the same thing for several hours, it is unlikely 
they would be able to overpower the frequency of hourly tweets 
about celebrities and musicians, or in the case of the Delhi incident, 
even the voices coming from other South Asians. The algorithms 
guiding Twitter ’s Trending and tag functions and, more recently, the 
Homepage Twitter feed, [25] likely would not highlight the concerns 
of Nepalis on Twitter or propel them to the forefront of discussions 
on women and public safety in South Asia. Moreover, according to 
Bidushi, journalists in Kathmandu had attempted to get the attention 
of International news organizations, but gave up after it seemed that 
such organizations were disinterested in Occupy Baluwatar. [26] 
Nepali activists’ ability to participate in a global discussion about 
women’s issues was limited by two things: the infrastructure of the 
Internet, and the choices of media outlets and consumers who did not 
actively seek out more information about violence against women in 
the region more broadly. The conversation about India did not expand 
to include the rest of South Asia.  From this, it is clear that Nepal’s 
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“low” position in the world in comparison to its neighbor, India, is 
reflected and reinforced in global online public space.
 What began as a call for justice for Sita Rai became an important case 
study into the meanings and practices of social media in Kathmandu, 
South Asia, and the world. The exclusion of activists in Occupy 
Baluwatar at a regional and global level also show how the stories and 
voices of Nepalis are left out of digitally linked conversations because 
of structural barriers, both online and offline. Occupy Baluwatar 
shows us that social media’s democratizing promise is still subject to 
structural problems and conflicts, including economic development 
and class, caste, racial, ethnic, and gender disparities.
 Like many of the Twitter activists of Occupy Baluwatar, Westerners 
tend to see the Internet as both a normal component of our social 
and political lives and simultaneously as something fundamentally 
different from politics-as-usual in its ability to circumvent the physical, 
in-person boundaries that exist between people. Those boundaries 
can be the result of security forces, as in the case of Bhattarai, or the 
geographical boundaries that exist between friends, family members, 
or political allies who live across the globe. 
As we have seen with the Arab Uprisings and various global Occupy 
movements, the Internet holds tremendous potential for social change 
and political mobilization – yet it can be difficult to reconcile this 
obvious potential with the material limitations of the power of the 
Internet that emerge due to social and structural digital inequalities. 
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From the case of Occupy Baluwatar, it is clear that the power of the 
Internet emerges not simply from its existence in social and political 
spheres, but from the ways that people access and understand it.
This essay has explored the myriad ways that digital inequality 
manifested and impacted a single prolonged instance of political 
mobilization in Nepal. These issues included the difficulties of 
engaging a majority of a population that is not online and the 
barriers to galvanizing support for localized movements like Occupy 
Baluwatar. From Occupy Baluwatar, we learn that the roots of digital 
inequality are more than just the algorithms, but are socially and 
politically enforced by Internet users all over the world and in our 
localized contexts. 
The implications of these findings are as yet unclear. The media 
coverage and social media response to Occupy Baluwatar suggests that 
this political mobilization in Nepal bears little personal or geopolitical 
significance for most Westerners, apart from South Asian specialists 
and academics. At present, digital inequality continues to exacerbate 
and reify social and political divisions locally, regionally, and globally. 
The promise of the Internet to illuminate all corners of the globe is 
perhaps overly optimistic considering the discrepancy in coverage, 
concern, and education about Nepal. However, this discrepancy begs 
the question - what are our obligations and responsibilities as citizens 
of the Internet? In what ways should the technological, social, and 
political configurations of the Internet be used to reconfigure and 
reshape physical, offline boundaries?  From the analysis presented 
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here, the answers to these questions will likely not be found in the 
technological and structural changes to the Web, but from the choices 
and actions of ordinary citizens, online and offline. 
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